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Viewing cable 08STATE15220, s) further scheming by german firm to export

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08STATE15220**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08STATE15220	2008-02-14 14:33	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.spiegel.de>

P 141433Z FEB 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S e c r e t state 015220

Sipdis

E.o. 12958: decl: 02/14/2033
Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcrc, ksca, gm, ir

Subject: (s) further scheming by german firm to export
test chamber to iranian ballistic missile program

Ref: a. 05 state 201650

1B. 05 berlin 3726
c. 05 state 211408
d. 05 berlin 3954
e. 06 state 36325
f. 06 berlin 674
g. 06 state 62278
h. 06 berlin 1123
i. 06 state 70328
j. 06 berlin 1229
k. 06 berlin 1550
l. Mtcrc poc 201/2006 - may 16 2006

m. 07 state 75839
n. 07 berlin 1137
o. 07 state 108420
p. 07 berlin 002163
q. 07 state 166482
r. 07 berlin 2216

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see Paragraph 7.

¶2. (S) Background/Objective: Since November 2005, we have discussed with German officials efforts by Iran's solid propellant missile developer - the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) - to procure environmental test chambers from the German firm xxxxxxxxxxxx (Refs). SBIG has conducted its dealings with xxxxxxxxxxxx through the Iranian intermediary xxxxxxxxxxxx Ltd. and the missile-related front companies xxxxxxxxxxxx, and xxxxxxxxxxxx.

¶3. (S) In April 2006, Germany denied a request by xxxxxxxxxxxx to export environmental chambers to xxxxxxxxxxxx (Ref K). This denial came shortly after having been alerted by the USG to SBIG's use of xxxxxxxxxxxx as a front company (Refs E & G). Germany has also sensitized xxxxxxxxxxxx GmbH - the manufacturer of the test chamber - to its concerns about this case (Ref P).

¶4. (S) In June 2007, we alerted the FRG that xxxxxxxxxxxx - in a further attempt to evade German export controls - in mid-March 2007 suggested to xxxxxxxxxxxx that a thermal shock chamber be shipped to Iran using Croatian, Romanian or Russian intermediaries (Ref M). We subsequently advised German officials that in late May 2007, the Croatian firm xxxxxxxxxxxx made an offer to xxxxxxxxxxxx - on behalf of xxxxxxxxxxxx - for the sale of a shock chamber (Ref O).

¶5. (S) We now have information indicating that as of mid-December 2007, xxxxxxxxxxxx had discussed routing the shock chamber through xxxxxxxxxxxx in the United Arab Emirates. xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently agreed to falsely list an entity in Tajikistan as the end-user, but xxxxxxxxxxxx would actually forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran. xxxxxxxxxxxx also requested an inspection and training course in Germany for two or three engineers prior to the machine's shipment to Iran.

¶6. (S) Objective: We want to share this most recent information with FRG officials, and encourage them to continue their work to prevent xxxxxxxxxxxx from supplying Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program with shock chambers.

¶7. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy Berlin approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 8 and report response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.

¶8. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(secret//rel germany)

-- Since November 2005, we have been discussing with you efforts by Iran's xxxxxxxxxxxx to procure environmental test chambers from the German firm xxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Iran's missile program.

-- In early June 2007, we shared information with you indicating that in mid-March 2007, xxxxxxxxxxxx was working with xxxxxxxxxxxx to provide a 2-zone thermal shock chamber type xxxxxxxxxxxx to Iran's xxxxxxxxxxxx, an entity associated with the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), Iran's primary developer of solid-fueled ballistic missiles.

-- As we advised you in June, xxxxxxxxxxxx representatives

xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx had suggested to xxxxxxxxxxxx that the shipment be routed through Croatia, Romania, or Russia in order to disguise the fact that the actual end-user is in Iran.

-- You will also recall from our subsequent discussions in August that Croatia's xxxxxxxxxxxx had made a late-May offer to xxxxxxxxxxxx - on behalf of xxxxxxxxxxxx - for the sale of the shock chamber, and that xxxxxxxxxxxx had developed plans to ship the chamber to Croatia, where xxxxxxxxxxxx would act as an intermediary and forward the equipment to Iran.

-- We now have information indicating that as of December 2007, xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx continued their discussions related to the purchase by xxxxxxxxxxxx of a thermal shock chamber on behalf of Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program.

-- Specifically, we understand that xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx have discussed shipping the test chamber to xxxxxxxxxxxx in the United Arab Emirates.

-- xxxxxxxxxxxx appear to have agreed to falsely list an entity in Tajikistan as the end-user, but xxxxxxxxxxxx would actually forward the chamber directly from the UAE to Iran.

-- The test chamber is to be shipped within two to three months after an advance payment has been made. We do not know if any such payment has yet occurred.

-- We also understand that xxxxxxxxxxxx requested an inspection and training course in Germany for two or three engineers prior to the machine's shipment to Iran.

-- We are grateful for your continued cooperation on this case, and for measures you have taken in the past to prevent the shipment of this equipment to Iran.

-- We will continue to provide you with relevant information on this issue as it becomes available, and look forward to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper.

¶9. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann with any questions or follow-up related to this case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/AGS and EUR/PRA.

¶10. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
Rice

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